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ABSTRACT
This paper is an attempt at assessing the economic impact of market-
oriented reforms undertaken during General Franco’s dictatorship, in par-
ticular the 1959 Stabilisation and Liberalisation Plan. Using an index of
macroeconomic distortions, the relationship between economic policies and
the growth record is examined. Although a gradual reduction in macro-
economic distortions was already in motion during the 1950s, the 1959 Plan
opened the way to a new institutional design that favoured a free market
allocation of resources and allowed Spain to accelerate growth and catch up
with Western Europe. Without the 1950s reforms and, especially, the 1959
Plan, per capita GDP would have been significantly lower in 1975.
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RESUMEN
Este ensayo es un intento de evaluar el impacto econo´mico de las refor-
mas orientadas hacia el mercado llevadas a cabo durante la dictadura del
General Franco, en particular, el Plan de Estabilizacio´n y Liberalizacio´n de
1959. A partir de un ı´ndice de distorsiones macroecono´micas se examina la
relacio´n entre polı´ticas econo´micas y crecimiento. Aunque una reduccio´n
gradual de estas distorsiones se habı´a iniciado durante los an˜os cincuenta, el
Plan de 1959 dio lugar a un nuevo disen˜o institucional que favorecio´ la
asignacio´n de recursos con criterios de libre mercado y permitio´ a Espan˜a
acelerar su crecimiento y acortar distancias con Europa Occidental. Sin las
reformas econo´micas de los an˜os cincuenta y, en especial, del Plan de 1959,
el PIB per capita habrı´a sido significativamente inferior en 1975.
Palabras clave: Espan˜a, dictadura de Franco, reformas econo´micas,
estabilizacio´n, liberalizacio´n, crecimiento
1. INTRODUCTION
The economic policy varied substantially over the years that General Franco
remained in power (1939-1975). During its early years, the new regime intro-
duced a set of anti-market policies that altered the previous behaviour of the
Spanish economy dramatically. These measures resulted in high inflation rates,
the development of «black markets» and a contraction in international trade. In
a subsequent phase, during the 1950s, the most extreme interventionist policies
were relaxed, while the Spanish economy benefited from a (military and
technological) cooperation agreement with the U.S. government. A critical
economic situation by mid-1959, in particular a shortage of foreign reserves,
induced more drastic economic reforms. The authorities presented this set of
reforms as a package, the Liberalisation and Stabilisation Plan (hereafter PSL).
Simultaneously, Spain joined major international organisations increasingly
committing the government to the free market discipline. As a consequence,
inflation decreased, «black markets» disappeared, foreign investment increased
and international trade flourished1.
1 From our point of view, the Spanish Plan of Stabilisation and Liberalisation of 1959 could be
considered, to some extent, as a forerunner of the policy measures associated with the «Washington
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Our main goal is to test the impact of Franco’s economic policies on
Spanish economic growth quantitatively. In particular, we will revisit the
widespread claim that the new policies associated with the 1959 PSL had a
dramatic impact on Spain’s growth performance and explore the effects on
growth of the previous tentative steps to soften regulation and intervention.
A market-oriented reform is a policy measure that favours the competitive
participation of private agents in economic activity, and thus assessing the
impact of policy reforms is not an easy task and there are many ways to go
about it (see Loayza and Soto 2003). Our choice has been to construct an
index of macroeconomic distortions (hereafter IMD) and analyse its impact
on growth in several counterfactual scenarios.
In a nutshell, our results confirm the important role played by the PSL
and the subsequent reforms in promoting sustained economic growth while
stressing the permissive role played by the gradual and moderate reduction of
macroeconomic distortions during the 1950s. According to our calculations,
without these successive economic policy reforms, GDP would have been
significantly lower at the time of Franco’s death in 1975.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews Franco’s
regime growth record and its economic policy. In section 3, we introduce the
IMD, which allows us to determine major economic policy changes in
Spain2. Then, in section 4, we examine, with the help of a structural model,
the main determinants of growth, highlighting the deterrent role played by
macroeconomic distortions. As a sensitivity test, in section 5, we investigate
the economic impact of macroeconomic restrictions using a vector auto-
regression (VAR) approach. In both sections 4 and 5, the economic cost of
early Francoism anti-market policies is assessed by exploring alternative
counterfactual scenarios; and section 6 is the conclusion.
2. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND POLICY DURING
FRANCO’S REGIME
Economic performance during General Franco’s dictatorship represents
an exception in the economic history of Modern Spain (Figure 1). Franco’s
regime covered the period from the end of the Civil War (1936-1939) to the
dictator’s death in 1975. A closer look reveals that, after the contraction that
(F’note continued)
Consensus» (Williamson, 1990). These reforming programmes usually include measures conducive
to trade and capital account liberalisation, macroeconomic policies to reduce inflation and the size
of the fiscal imbalances, and other reforms to protect private property rights and to reduce the
activity of the government (see Fischer (2003) and, more recently, Shleifer (2009) and Edwards
(2009)).
2 Previous studies have used similar indicators of macroeconomic policy (cf. Fischer 1993;
Barro 1996; Durlauf et al. 2008; Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya 2009).
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resulted from the Civil War and a very slow recovery during the 1940s, per
capita GDP growth intensified in the 1950s and accelerated dramatically
from the 1959 PSL up to 1974.
In comparative perspective, during the early phase of Franco’s dictator-
ship, Spain’s growth record was highly disappointing. Spain did not recover
its pre-Civil War per capita GDP peak levels (1929) until 1955, while Western
European countries reached, on average, 1938 levels of GDP per head by
1950. Such a difference is more striking given that the destruction of lives
and physical capital, as a consequence of the Spanish Civil War, was lower
than in most of Western European countries involved in the World War II3.
However, an intense destruction of human capital occurred as a result of
political exile and post-war political repression (see Lo´pez Garcı´a 1991; Prados
de la Escosura 2007; Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s 2010b). The situation
began to change in the 1950s when, in per capita terms, the Spanish economy
grew at a similar rate to the Western European average, but with the significant
difference that Spain started from a substantially lower level4. It was during the
FIGURE 1
REAL PER CAPITA GDP, 1850-2000 (000 PESETAS) (2000 PRICES)
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Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003, updated).
3 See quantitative assessments in Catalan (1995), Reher (2003), Ortega and Silvestre (2006),
Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2010a) and Rose´s (2008).
4 Spain and Western Europe grew at 4.4 and 3.9 per cent yearly during the period 1952-1958.
However, countries that experienced a reconstruction process grew at much faster pace. For
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last period of Franco’s rule (1959-1975) when per capita GDP growth reached
an unprecedented intensity in Spain, not far behind that of 1950s Germany and
significantly above Western Europe and the United States.
At first sight, significant differences in the forces behind economic growth
can be observed between the three periods mentioned above (Table 1). In the
earlier period, 1939-1951, per capita income growth (2.1 per cent) depended,
almost equally, on the increase in GDP per hour worked (0.9 per cent per year)
and on the rise in hours worked per person (1.1 per cent). Efficiency gains
explained, in turn, all the improvement in labour productivity. In the second
period, 1952-1958, per capita GDP growth accelerated (4.4 per cent) depending
exclusively on the increase in labour productivity (4.2 per cent), which largely
resulted from efficiency gains (2.6 per cent), but also from broad capital
deepening. The pattern initiated in the 1950s intensified during 1959-1975,
with labour productivity (6.4 per cent) accounting for all the improvement in
per capita GDP (5.6 per cent), while the rise in total factor productivity (4.2 per
cent) accounts for two-thirds of the increase in output per hour worked.
Why was the economic growth record so disappointing during the early
period of Franco’s rule? Why did the economy grow during the 1950s with no
apparent significant transformation of the political regime? What does
account for the acceleration in Spain’s pace of growth since 1960?
The early years of the dictatorship — from the Civil War up to the early
1950s — represented a dramatic rupture with the economic policies pre-
valent in Spain from the mid-19th century. Effective possession of legislative
and judicial powers gave Franco’s dictatorship the ability to alter economic
and political rights discretionally. The dictatorship did not reassure eco-
nomic agents of the New State’s commitment to private property and the free
market. Quite the contrary, the new authorities shared a strong anti-market
attitude and their economic policy often threatened private initiative and
investment (Fraile Balbı´n 1998). Severe market controls aimed at economic
autarchy were implemented (Barciela 2002). The new state-owned enter-
prises began by controlling «strategic» industries seeking technical solutions
to maximise the amount of production, bypassing the opportunity cost of
their decisions (Martı´n Acen˜a and Comı´n 1991). Labour relations were sub-
ordinated to the «national interest» and employers and workers incorporated
into a single «vertical» union in an attempt to harmonise diverging social and
economic interests (Gonza´lez 1979). This economic policy provided, in turn,
an advantageous position to those small groups and coalitions which, in
exchange for support to the dictatorship, would derive rents from the public
(F’note continued)
example, Italy grew at 4.9 per cent and Germany at 6.5 per cent. Growth rates computed from
Prados de la Escosura (2003) for Spain and Maddison (2009) for the rest of countries. Western
Europe is a population-weighted average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
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TABLE 1
SPAIN’S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ITS SOURCES
GDP growth decomposition
Per capita GDP growth
decomposition
Sources of labour productivity
growth
GDP Population Per capita GDP
Hours worked
per person
GDP per hour
worked Land
Capital
input
Labour
quality TFP
1939-1951 2.9 0.8 2.1 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.1 20.4 1.2
1952-1958 5.2 0.8 4.4 0.2 4.2 20.3 1.2 0.8 2.6
1959-1975 6.7 1.1 5.6 20.8 6.4 0.0 1.3 0.9 4.2
Sources: Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009).
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sector and even control the state’s economic decisions (Fraile Balbı´n 1999). To
make the economic situation even worse, economic agents were uncertain
about how long the regime would last (Calvo-Gonza´lez 2001, 2007a).
Although the size of the government increased (Figure 2), no tax reform to
boost its revenues was introduced until 1957, as apparently a clash with interest
groups supporting the regime was feared (Dı´az Fuentes 1994; Comı´n 1996).
Thus, a large amount of debt was issued while a policy of low nominal interest
rates was implemented. In addition, limits to fiduciary circulation were sus-
pended and the Bank of Spain was given full power for proceeding with debt
monetisation. Under these circumstances, monetary policy succumbed to the
demands of the government budget (Martı´n Acen˜a 1994). Clearly, the potential
inflationary risks of this new monetary management were very high, since any
increase in public debt could determine a monetary expansion. In consequence,
inflation rates were comparatively high during the early years of Franco’s
rule even though inflation was repressed through officially established prices
(Figure 3). The inflation rate was, on average, 10 per cent higher than that of the
1940s. It decreased to 8 per cent in the 1950s, and after the stabilisation mea-
sures inflation rates practically halved, falling below 6 per cent, on average,
during 1959-1973, and only went up to 12 per cent after the 1973 oil shock5.
FIGURE 2
SHARE OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IN TOTAL CONSUMPTION, 1850-1975
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Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see the text.
5 See the discussion on inflation tendencies in Gonza´lez (1979).
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Franco’s regime also represented an exception from the point of view of
Spain’s integration in the international economy as it started with a dramatic
closing down followed, after the stabilisation plan of 1959, by opening up to a
historical maximum (Figure 4). The new regime strongly regulated foreign
currency markets aiming at having absolute control of foreign trade (Martı´nez
Ruiz 2003). The private possession of foreign currency was prohibited and
exporters forced to hand it over to the Spanish Institute for Foreign Currency
(IEME) at the official, overvalued exchange rate6. The overvaluation of the
exchange rate, a matter of national pride for the Franco regime, harmed exports
and fed the desire to import. To avoid collapse, the regulation and control of
currency trade was very strict. The outcome of all these policies was a strong
premium for currency exchange in the «black market», and thus a substantial
deviation between the official and the free market exchange rate of the peseta7.
During the 1950s, economic interventionism was relaxed, but not sup-
pressed, and the international isolation Spain had suffered since 1945, due to
FIGURE 3
INFLATION RATE, 1850-1975 (%)
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Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see the text.
6 The creation of the IEME, which monopolised the deposit of and trade in all currencies,
deprived the Bank of Spain of the exchange rate policy control, separating artificially the man-
agement of internal and external monetary policy (Martı´nez Ruiz 2003).
7 For example, in 1941, the official exchange rate was 10.95 pesetas per U.S. dollar but the free
exchange rate in Tangiers was 24.49 pesetas per dollar.
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Franco’s alignment with the Axis powers during the World War II, began to
decrease. Thus, the centralised allocation of scarce goods, namely food
rationing and quotas for raw materials and energy, was abolished (Barciela
2002). Yet, foreign investment continued to be harshly restricted (Vin˜as et al.
1979; Barciela 2002; Martı´nez Ruiz 2003). The new international context
dominated by the Cold War helped decisively to rehabilitate the regime of
General Franco in the international community. In November 1950, the
United States supported a vote in the U.N. General Assembly invalidating the
1946 resolution, which excluded Spain from this organisation, while the Pact
of Madrid (September 1953) committed the United States to provide an
unspecified amount of aid in return for the right to establish four military
bases in Spain (Calvo-Gonza´lez 2006)8. In the 1950s, fast and intensive
FIGURE 4
OPENNESS, 1850-2000 (EXPORTS AND IMPORTS AS % OF GDP)
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Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
8 According to Guirao (1998), U.S. financial support during the 1950s under the Pact of Madrid
was largely aimed at building U.S. military bases. However, Calvo-Gonza´lez (2007a) points out that
U.S. financial support was extremely important because it solved one of Spain’s main bottlenecks:
the lack of hard currency with which to finance. In any case, aid received by Spain did not have
comparable effects to those derived by Western European countries foreign trade from the Marshall
Plan (Prados de la Escosura and Sanz 1996). Furthermore, Spain did not benefit from externalities
that were associated with the U.S. aid to Western Europe (De Long and Eichengreen 1991) and was
excluded from the multilateral institutions that managed economic cooperation, trade and financial
imbalances.
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growth was apparently facilitated by the increasing confidence of economic
agents derived from the greater political stability that followed the
U.S.–Spain cooperation agreements (Calvo-Gonza´lez 2007a).
Reforms also arrived at the foreign exchange market. In an attempt to
dampen the negative effects of the prevalent exchange rate policy, the
authorities adopted a system of multiple exchange rates in 1948, which lasted
until July 1959 (Figure 5). This new system, designed to facilitate exports and
imports of certain goods by applying favourable exchange rates, has been
accused of hindering foreign trade and increasing corruption (Donges 1976;
de la Dehesa et al. 1991). Yet, the multiple exchange rate system allowed the
authorities to devalue the peseta surreptitiously (Serrano Sanz and Asensio
Castillo 1997). Thus, when computed with the official — and practically
fixed — exchange rate, the « black market» premium increased between 1948
and 1956. However, when an «effective» official exchange rate — derived by
weighting different official exchange rates by its relative importance within
the balance of payments on current account — is considered, a gradual
convergence is found between the free and the «effective» official exchange
rate, with a subsequent contraction in the « black market» premium (see
Serrano Sanz and Asensio Castillo (1997) and especially Martı´nez Ruiz 2003).
FIGURE 5
«BLACK MARKET» PREMIUM 1939-1975: TRADE-WEIGHTED AND UNWEIGHTED
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LEANDRO PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA/JOAN R. ROSE´S/ISABEL SANZ-VILLARROYA
54 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
In the late 1950s, there were clear signs of economic overheating such as
growing inflation and increasing external deficit. In particular, foreign
exchange reserves were exhausted by mid-1959. In such circumstances, a
complete economic policy reorientation, represented by the PSL, took place.
Spain opened up to major international organisations and committed to
gradual liberalisation9. Spanish presence in major international organisa-
tions was an implicit guarantee of the definitive abandonment of isolationist
options, legitimised the change in economic policy, facilitated the arrival of
foreign technical assistance and reduced the opposition to economic reforms
from within Franco’s regime (Sarda` 1970; Gonza´lez 1979; Fuentes Quintana
1984; Varela Parache 2004)10.
The 1959 PSL marked the beginning of a new era in the Spanish economy
as the country entered a process of economic liberalisation and international
market integration. Measures in three main areas deserve highlighting.
Firstly, a classical stabilisation operation was executed with the objective of
reducing inflation, which was mainly due to a lack of monetary discipline.
Public spending was controlled, the issue of new public debt limited and the
Bank of Spain’s discount rate increased. Secondly, domestic markets were
partly liberalised by suppressing regulations and simplifying administrative
procedures. Prices of goods (petrol, tobacco) and services (telephone,
transport) supplied by state monopolies were adjusted upwards in an
attempt to close the gap between official prices and their real provision costs.
Lastly, a liberalisation of foreign economic relations was implemented
(Fuentes Quintana 1984; de la Dehesa et al. 1991). In July 1959, Spanish
authorities liberalised 50 per cent of the nation’s trade. Eventually the
recurrent financial problems due to monetary isolation also persuaded the
authorities to rethink the exchange rate policy. In July 1959, and following
the convertibility of major European currencies in December 1958 (Toniolo
2005), the peseta became convertible with major European currencies and
integrated into the Bretton Woods system. This monetary integration was
accompanied by a more realistic exchange rate and the adherence to the
exchange rate discipline of the IMF11. As a consequence, the «black market»
premium for currency exchange disappeared abruptly. Also, restrictions on
foreign direct investment were relaxed (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002)12.
9 Spain integrated successively in the International Monetary Fund (IMF; 1958), the World
Bank (1958), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1959) and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1963).
10 Historians have usually claimed that these measures were influenced by IMF and OEEC (a
forerunner of the OECD) advice (Gonza´lez (1979), although discrepant views have been expressed
(Calvo-Gonza´lez 2007b).
11 The national currency devalued to 60 pesetas per U.S. dollar, a rate slightly higher than the
one prevailing on the black market (Martı´nez Ruiz 2003).
12 The IMF, the OEEC, the Bank for International Settlements and several U.S. private banks
provided financial coverage for the operation of the Stabilisation Plan through grants and loans in
hard currency, its total estimated at $544 million (Guirao 1998).
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All major contingency measures contained in the 1959 Plan were suc-
cessful: inflation declined, the budget deficit disappeared and an inflow of
foreign capital took place (Prados de la Escosura and Sanz 1996). By
implementing the new policy, Franco’s regime showed its commitment to
orthodox macroeconomic policies and offered a precedent of responsible
behaviour to domestic and foreign investors.
After the 1959 Plan, and accompanying the integration of Spain into
international organisations, a liberalisation of foreign economic relations
was implemented. Quantitative restrictions on foreign trade were replaced
by more flexible and less distorting tariffs. Nevertheless, in early 1959, lib-
eralised trade (i.e. imports entering with the only requirement of satisfying
the tariff) was only 9 per cent of total trade, while the remainder was subject
to quotas, special trade or bilateral agreements. By 1973, liberalised trade
reached 80 per cent of the total, while quotas and special trade had almost
disappeared (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).
Spain’s commitment to openness continued during the remaining years
of Franco’s dictatorship (1960-1975). Integrating the peseta in the Bretton
Woods system led to its convertibility at a more realistic exchange rate.
This was completed with a moderate financial liberalisation on the capital
inflows in the long term, while short-term outflows were restricted13. Trade
liberalisation was gradual since the rapid decrease of quantitative restric-
tions was partly counterbalanced by an increase in tariff rates (Donges
1976)14. The preferential agreements with the European Economic Commu-
nity in 1970 resulted in a new decrease in tariffs and increases in trade quotas
with member countries. Large trade imbalances were financed by foreign
investment, tourism and emigrant remittances (Prados de la Escosura and
Sanz 1996; Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).
3. MEASURING MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS
Can these policy reforms and their impact on long-run growth be assessed
quantitatively? To meet this challenge, we investigate the extent to which
these policies affected broad capital accumulation and efficiency gains.
A fundamental problem in analysing the impact of economic reforms
is that the different policies were not independent from each other and were
often implemented simultaneously. From an econometric point of view, this
13 This was quite common in western countries at the time and consistent with the scarce
presence of foreign banks in Spain. In addition, the system of fixed exchange rates seemed to
require, in the peripheral countries, tight exchange controls to prevent potentially destabilizing
short-term speculative operations (See, for example, Eichengreen et al. 2003).
14 International commitments forced Spain to attend the GATT negotiating rounds. For
example, in the Kennedy Round of GATT (1964-1967), Spain agreed tariff reductions introduced
between 1968 and 1972 (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).
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may mean that the different explanatory variables are correlated. Therefore,
we need to capture those features of macroeconomic policies that could
influence economic performance while avoiding cross-correlation between
different policy indicators. The solution is provided by an Index of Macro-
economic Distortions (IMD hereafter)15.
The selection of the variables compounding the IMD is not ad hoc
since we have considered those variables that seem more representative of
Francoist economic policies16. In the construction of the IMD, we have used
factorial analysis based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA hereafter),
which assigns weight on the basis of the distributions and interrelations
between the various underlining components17. The results obtained from
the application of this methodology are presented in Appendix 2. After
exploring different alternative components for the IMD, we reached the
conclusion that the «best» index combines three macroeconomic variables:
the rate of inflation, the differential between the official and the free market
exchange rates (the «black market» premium) and the share of government
consumption within total consumption18. Thus, IMD has been obtained as a
linear combination of these variables in which the values assigned by PCA to
each component, expressed as a proportion of their total value, are used as
their respective weight.
The inclusion of these variables can be justified in economic terms. A high
(and volatile) rate of inflation implies an absence of sound money and
undermines gains from trade, and therefore has a negative impact on eco-
nomic growth19. Moreover, it alters the fundamental terms of long-term
contracts, leading to a decrease in economic confidence20.
15 Our index is related to the index of economic freedom (IEF) published by the Fraser Institute
since 1996 (Gwartney et al. 1996) and to the «reduced» IEF developed by Prados de la Escosura and
Sanz-Villarroya (2009).
16 Furthermore, our variables closely resemble those employed by Fisher (1993), Barro (1996)
and Durlauf et al. (2008) to account for the impact of macroeconomic policy on cross-country
differences in GDP growth.
17 Some critics stress that the PCA fails to reflect a conceptual link between the theory behind
the choice of elements and the index itself. Others observe that the results are sensitive to the scale
of measurement of the different variables under consideration and highlight the ambiguity involved
in the interpretation of the results. Finally, it is argued that this methodology assigns lower weights
to variables that are highly correlated with others (Heckelman and Stroup, 2005, p. 957). It should
be noted, however, that in this particular case the problems derived from applying this methodology
appear to be minor.
18 Government consumption covers government spending on goods and services (administra-
tion, military, judicial system, etc.), while it excludes, in addition to health and education expen-
diture, public transfers (such as social security, unemployment benefits and retirement pensions)
and gross fixed capital formation. In other words, it measures the part of government spending that
not directly devoted to productive activities or to increasing private consumption.
19 We have followed the Fraser Institute’s IEF in computing the variable Inflation as inflation
rate/(1001 inflation rate; See Gwartney et al. 1996.
20 The relationship between inflation and growth has provoked an intense debate since Barro’s
(1995) seminal contribution.
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Exchange rate controls, in so far as they reduce the convertibility of
currency, hold back international trade, foreign investment and private
confidence in government behaviour. In particular, capital controls do have
an important negative effect on economic growth (Chanda 2005). In countries
with powerful interest groups, capital controls lead to greater inefficiencies and
lower economic growth.
Finally, as regards the share of public consumption in total consumption,
it is generally accepted that the government should provide public goods for
which free markets do not produce efficient results (De Haan et al. 2006).
However, when public spending increases its share of total spending, poli-
tical decision-making is substituted for personal choice, and consequently
economic freedom declines.
The years 1936-1958 appear to be an exceptional period in the evolution
of IMD, with only the milder precedent of the World War I (Figure 6).
A significant increase took place from 1936 up to 1947, where it stayed at a
high level, until a gradual decline started in 1951, and was sustained during
the 1950s. A merely episodic reversal took place between 1956 and 1959,
which could be associated with populist policies implemented by the Min-
istry of Labour, which led to a substantial pay rise across the board in 1956
and a subsequent inflation upsurge (Barciela 2002). Then, the IMD remained
stable at low values until it rose again after the 1973 oil shock.
FIGURE 6
INDEX OF MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS 1850-1975
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4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF IMD ON GROWTH:
A STRUCTURAL MODEL
Per capita income differences across countries are often explained as a
result of differences in broad capital endowments and TFP (cf. Hall and
Jones 1999). Economic policies under Franco’s Regime may have had con-
siderable influence on the sources of economic growth.
Our starting point is a conventional augmented-Solow model a´ la Mankiw
et al. (1992), in which GDP (in logs) is dependent on the quantity of labour, in
logs, (measured by the number of hours worked, LAB hereafter), the rate of
investment (the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP at current prices,
INVT), the quality of labour (improvements in labour’s skills as a measure of
human capital, HK, in logs) and total factor productivity (TFP, in logs)21.
GDP is not fully defined because we do not include land in our calculations
and TFP is not a combination of the INVT, HK and LAB variables22 (Table 2).
log GDP¼ a0 þ a1 log LABþ a2 log INVTþ a3 log HKþ a4 log TFPþ  ½1
The hypothesis is that macroeconomic distortions, as measured by IMD,
decreased efficiency gains and disrupted capital accumulation. For this
reason, TFP, HK and INVT have been endogeneised, and thus the impact
macroeconomic distortions have on them is taken into account, while
allowing for additional exogenous variables23.
There are several channels through which the macroeconomic policy may
have affected TFP growth, because this is the result of both efficiency gains
and technological changes (Harberger 1998). We postulate that TFP (in logs)
depends on IMD, the degree of openness (measured as the ratio of exports
plus imports to GDP, OPEN, in logs) and previous levels of human capital
and GDP, which are proxies for the actual technological capability24.
log TFP¼b0 þb1 IMDþb2 log OPENþb3 log HKþb4 log GDPþ  ½2
In order to explain investment rates, we have related the share of capital
formation in GDP to the relative price of capital, the degree of financial
21 Other studies show that per capita income differences across countries are explained taking
into account differences in capital endowments and TFP (Hall and Jones 1999). The sources for the
data used in this section are detailed in Appendix 3 (see also Table 2).
22 TFP is drawn from the growth accounting exercise in Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s
(2009).
23 However, we have not followed the same procedure with LAB because we assume that is
mainly driven by exogenous demographic forces and unexpected shocks such as wars (which are
independent from macroeconomic policies.
24 Anti-trade policies decrease TFP as international trade is a significant carrier of R&D knowledge
(Coe and Helpman 1995, Madsen 2007). Similarly, policies limiting FDI investment may also damage
TFP gains (Haskel et al. 2007). In consequence, we introduce OPEN as a control variable because some
changes in trade policy (like modifications in quotas) could not be well captured by IMD.
ECONOMIC REFORMS AND GROWTH IN FRANCO’S SPAIN
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 59
development, the level of GDP and the degree of income inequality. Thus, the
rate of capital accumulation has been associated with the relative price of
capital goods (Taylor 1998). Here, instead of the relative price of capital
goods, we use the user cost of capital, since it is a more accurate measure as
it includes the price of capital goods, the interest rate and the depreciation
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Mean s.d.
GDP 5.653 0.736
INVT 11.84 6.753
TFP 4.911 0.288
LAB 5.038 0.309
HK 4.704 0.105
RUCK 4.400 0.409
DEPTH 21.053 0.466
GINI 20.982 0.173
IMD 1.545 1.033
OPEN 22.032 0.413
INTEREST 1.874 0.256
CIM 21.124 0.894
INVT: investment rate; TFP: total factor productivity; LAB: labour quantity; HK: labour quality; RUCK:
relative user’s cost of capital; IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions; INTEREST: nominal interest rate;
CIM: contract-intensive money.
Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD.
Sources:
Real GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A.11.7.
INVT: Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A.13.3.
TFP: Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009).
LAB: Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009).
HK: Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009).
RUCK: user’s cost of capital, Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009); GDP deflator: Prados de la
Escosura (2003), Table A.11.9.
DEPTH (M2/GDP): M2: Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005), Table 9.16; GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003),
Table A.13.1.
GINI: Prados de la Escosura (2008).
IMD: see the text.
OPEN (openness measured as % (Exports1 Imports)/GDP: Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table
A.13.1.
INTEREST: Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005), Table 9.17.
CIM: (M2-Cash)/M2), Prados de la Escosura estimates (unpublished).
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rate, relative to the consumption deflator (hereafter, RUCK). In addition, we
expect financial development (measured as M2 over GDP, DEPTH, there-
after) to encourage, ceteris paribus, investment. As regards the role of
inequality in capital accumulation, there are competing views: on the one
hand, the negative connection between inequality and investment, as a
result of social instability, has been stressed (Alesina and Perotti 1996); on
the other hand, a positive link associating, at low levels of per capita income,
inequality with increased saving and investment has been claimed (Kaldor
1955-1956). We use the Gini coefficient as our income inequality measure
(GINI, hereafter). Specifically, the share of investment in GDP (INVT) is
related to (the logs of) RUCK, DEPTH, GDP and GINI.
INVT¼ c0 þ c1 log RUCKþ c2 log DEPTHþ c3 log GDPþ c4 log GINIþ 
½3
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that price distortions ––
caused by factors ranging from taxes on capital goods and barriers to capital
goods imports to monopoly rights for domestic capital good producers —
play a prominent role in explaining the relative price of capital goods (Jones
1994; Collins and Williamson 2001; Eaton and Kortum 2001; Restuccia and
Urrutia 2001). For these reasons, the relative user cost of capital (RUCK) is
assumed to depend on IMD and also on GDP level.
log RUCK¼d0 þd1 IMDþ c2 log GDPþ  ½4
Lastly, the quality of labour, or human capital, depends on the level of
development (GDP) and past levels of TFP25. In the structural model, IMD
affects TFP, and TFP affects labour quality.
log HK¼ e0 þ e1 log GDPþ e2 log TFPþ  ½5
To investigate the relationship between IMD and GDP, we have con-
structed a structural model as a system of simultaneous equations (equations
[1]-[5]) We have used three-stage least squares (3SLS) in the estimate that
solves the problem of contemporary correlation between the equations’
residuals and deals with the endogeneity problem often present in this kind
of exercise (see Appendix 3 for a detailed exposition of the econometric
procedure). The results are presented in Table 3.
The results are in line with our predictions, and all variables have the expected
sign at the conventional levels of significance. Not surprisingly, we found that
IMD had a negative impact on GDP levels channelled through factor accumu-
lation (via the relative price user cost of capital) and TFP levels. The results from
equations [2]-[5] help us to establish the relationship between IMD and GDP
25 Cervellati and Sunde (2005) have shown that this relation exists.
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determinants. Equation [2] shows that a lower degree of macroeconomic dis-
tortions, a higher degree of openness and a higher level of human capital and
GDP, in previous periods, guarantee a higher TFP level. In fact, a 10 per cent
increase in IMD leads to a decrease of about 6 per cent in the TFP level.
TABLE 3
ECONOMETRIC MODEL: STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION (1850-1975)
Dependent
variable
GDP
(equation
[1])
TFP
(equation
[2])
INVT
(equation
[3])
RUCK
(equation
[4])
HK
(equation
[5])
Constant 28.527 (29.349) 2.585 (13.644) 3.332 (21.619)
INVT (21) 0.0078 (2.975)
TFP (23) 0.936 (13.626)
TFP (210) 0.158 (3.679)
LAB 1.331 (13.670)
HK 0.598 (1.878)
HK (26) 0.709 (26.337)
RUCK 23.117 (23.546)
DEPTH 4.689 (6.249)
GINI 6.058 (3.142)
GDP 6.436 (9.968) 0.271 (7.782) 0.107 (10.649)
GDP (21) 0.323 (20.728)
IMD (21) 0.179 (7.088)
IMD (23) 20.060 (24.526)
OPEN 0.068 (2.069)
Adjusted R2 0.990 0.936 0.769 0.567 0.947
Number of
observations
123 115 118 122 116
Notes: See Appendix 1 for the definition of independent variables.
Three-stages least square method has been used.
t-ratios are given in brackets; the number of lags appears in brackets after the variable’s name. For example
INVT (21).
GDP, TFP, HK, OPEN, LAB and RUCK are in logs. Instrumental variables are:
Equation [1]: constant, INVT (22), TFP (22), TFP (23), LAB (21), RUCK, IMD, OPEN: OPEN (21) and
OPEN (22) and HK.
Equation [2]: constant, LAB(21), HK(21), GDP (22), OPEN (22), OPEN (23), CIM (21), CIM (contract-
intensive money), [M22C)/M2], C being currency outside banks (see Clague et al. 1999) and INTEREST (real
interest rate).
Equation [3]: constant, INTEREST (21), INTEREST (23), IMD: IMD (21), DEPTH, OPEN (21), OPEN (22),
GDP (21) and GDP (22).
Equation [4]: constant, IMD (22), IMD (23), OPEN (24) and GDP (21).
Equation [5]: constant, GDP (21), GDP (22), TFP (21), TFP (22), TFP (23), IMD: IMD (21) and OPEN:
OPEN (21).
Sources: Appendix 3.
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Equations [3] and [4] analyse the impact of distortions on physical capital
investment. We found that IMD influenced RUCK positively, which in turn
influenced investment negatively. In other words, macroeconomic distor-
tions reduced investment by increasing the user cost of capital (note that the
partial elasticity of RUCK with respect of IMD is 0.18). Results from equation
[3] lend support to the view that attributes lower rates of capital accumu-
lation to higher RUCK. The estimates also suggest that the degree of financial
development (DEPTH), inequality (GINI) and the level of GDP are associated
with an increase in the rate of investment (INVT). In sum, investment is
negatively correlated with distorting policies and positively correlated with
inequality and financial development. Why inequality is associated with a
higher rate of capital accumulation deserves further research.
Lastly, equation [5] discusses the underlying determinants of human
capital levels. No clear-cut evidence of IMD impact on human capital (HK)
seems to exist, since it is determined by GDP and TFP levels. However, as
discussed earlier, IMD may influence HK indirectly by reducing both TFP
and GDP levels.
How does the structural model perform? In order to find out we have used
its parameters with the historical values of the exogenous variables to predict
the value of each dependent variable (GDP, investment, human capital and
TFP) and then confront this baseline with its actual value. In Figures 7-10,
FIGURE 7
REAL GDP, 1850-1975 (LOGS): ACTUAL AND MODEL SIMULATION (BASELINE)
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Sources: Table 3. See the text.
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we observe that the simulated values track the actual values of the endo-
genous variables reasonably well over the long run and, in particular, during
the period considered, 1939-1975, both before and after the 1959 Stabilisa-
tion Plan. More specifically, the evolution of GDP and human capital is
tracked closely by the model simulations and that of the TFP and the
investment rate to a lesser extent. Predictions over shorter periods, however,
are less accurate (see, for example, how the model fails to capture the
volatility of the actual investment rate and the productivity collapse during
the early 1930s).
In order to estimate the economic impact of macroeconomic distortions,
as captured by the IMD, during the early phase of Franco’s dictatorship
(1939-1959), and thus weigh up the contribution of the 1959 PSL to eco-
nomic growth, we have carried out a counterfactual exercise26.
We propose two counterfactual scenarios, in which the estimated coef-
ficients in Table 3 together with the values of each variable may be used to
explore some hypothetical alternatives. Firstly, we consider a hypothetical
FIGURE 8
INVESTMENT RATE (% GDP), 1850-1975: ACTUAL AND MODEL SIMULATION
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Sources: Table 3. See the text.
26 Carreras (1982, 1992) and Martı´n Acen˜a (2004) investigated a counterfactual scenario but
did not carry out any formal quantitative estimation of the impact of Franco’s economic policies.
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situation in which the average value of IMD during 1939-1951 would have
been retained during the period 1952-1975 (scenario I). This is an extreme
situation that simulates autarchy throughout the entire Franco regime. Then,
a less astringent assumption is made in scenario II: the IMD average value
for 1952-1958 would have remained in place until 1975, that is, had the PSL
failed to be implemented. This seems a plausible scenario if the reformists’
advice had been rejected by Franco and his closest advisers at the con-
juncture of acute lack of foreign reserves faced by Spain in 1959. In scenarios
I and II, we expect lower values than those actually observed.
The outcomes of these counterfactual exercises are compared to the
baseline results of the structural model for each dependent variable in
Figures 11-14, as well as to their baseline and actual values in Table 4. These
results lend strong support to the hypothesis that macroeconomic policy
conducted during the early part of Franco’s regime damaged the Spanish
economy severely. For each variable, absolute and per capita GDP, invest-
ment, human capital and TFP, the impact of Franco’s economic policy was
damaging. More prominently, the major channel by which IMD affected
economic growth was through TFP. In other words, bad policies translated
into lower TFP growth.
FIGURE 9
HUMAN CAPITAL, 1850-1975 (LOGS): ACTUAL AND MODEL SIMULATION
(BASELINE)
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However, non-negligible differences are observed between the hypothe-
tical results cast by scenarios I and II. To be more precise, for the period
1959-1975, real GDP per head would have grown at 60 per cent of its actual
rate under scenario I and at 75 per cent under scenario II.
What would have been, then, Spain’s relative position at the end of
Franco’s dictatorship if pre-1959 macroeconomic distortions had remained
in place? Spain’s counterfactual position relative to Western Europe shows
that catching up to Western Europe would have been deferred until the early
1970s under scenario I, and until the mid-1960s under scenario II (Figure 15).
Comparative levels of GDP per head in 1975 for actual and counterfactual
Spain (resulting from scenarios I and II) are presented in Table 5. Spain,
already at the bottom of Western Europe, would have fallen further: below
Argentina, Greece and Ireland, and close to Portugal, in the relatively benign
scenario II, and below Poland, Hungary and Uruguay, and close to Mexico, in
scenario I.
To sum up, these counterfactual exercises lend strong support to the
hypothesis that macroeconomic policies conducted during the early Franco
regime seriously damaged the Spanish economy. Furthermore, the view of
the first two decades of Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1959) as a monolithic
FIGURE 10
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY, 1850-1975 (LOGS): ACTUAL AND MODEL
SIMULATION (BASELINE)
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autarchic era is challenged by these results27. Our results stress that the (de facto)
mild and gradual liberalisation that occurred during the 1950s — which trans-
lated into lower inflation and a convergence between the official and the free
market exchange rate — helped improve economic performance and portrayed
the 1959 structural reforms as the response to a growth crisis rather than the
reaction to a collapsing economy. As in other historical experiences (i.e. Latin
America in the period 1940-1980), in Spain inward-looking policies did not
preclude growth but set limits to its sustainability over the long run.
5. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF IMD ON GROWTH: A VAR
APPROACH
How robust might our results be? In the absence of a theoretical model, a
complementary way of assessing the impact of IMD on growth can be
FIGURE 11
REAL GDP, 1939-1975 (LOGS). STRUCTURAL MODEL SIMULATIONS: BASELINE
AND COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIOS
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Sources: Table 3. See the text.
27 Gonza´lez (1979), among others, had stressed the differences between the 1940s and 1950s.
Nonetheless, such differences are often neglected in the literature when it comes to discussing the
impact of the PSL.
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obtained through the estimation of vector autoregressive models (VAR),
which have the advantage over the previous approach, based on a structural
model of not assuming any a priori causal link among the considered vari-
ables. At the same time, a VAR approach provides a sensitivity test to the
results obtained with the structural model in the previous section.
Our empirical goal is to find a stable long-run relationship between IMD
and a set of variables, which constitute the immediate determinants of
growth, and to test for causality, that is, for the direction in which these
variables influence each other. Owing to the fact that all the variables are
integrated of order one (as shown in Appendix 3), we have carried out a
stationary VAR analysis between IMD and the relevant variables affecting
growth (that is, human and physical capital and TFP), all of them in differ-
ences, for the period 1850-197528.
The results are provided in Tables A4.1-A4.4 of Appendix 4. In all cases,
IMD is statistically significant. We can observe that the growth rates of
physical and human capital and labour quantity, as well as TFP, are negatively
FIGURE 12
INVESTMENT RATE (% GDP), 1939-1975. STRUCTURAL MODEL SIMULATIONS:
BASELINE AND COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIOS
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28 We have estimated the VARs for the period 1850-1975 in order to consider the long-run
dimension of the relationship between each pair of variables.
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affected by IMD. Furthermore, a bidirectional causality between physical
capital, on the one hand, and IMD, on the other, has been found. Thus, macro-
economic distortions reduced physical capital accumulation, which in turn led
to inefficient policies and new distortions. However, between IMD and human
capital, and IMD and TFP, respectively, the causality is unidirectional, and thus
macroeconomic distortions result in lower human capital accumulation and
efficiency; however, lower growth rates of human capital and TFP do not
imply macroeconomic distortions. Our results also confirm a not statistically
significant association between IMD and the growth rate of labour quantity.
As with the structural model, we explore two different hypothetical
scenarios in an attempt to assess the economic impact of macroeconomic
distortions during early Francoism (1939-1959).
Firstly, the individual impact of IMD on broad capital and TFP in
scenario I (in which the average value of IMD during 1939-1951 would have
remained unaltered for the period 1952-1975) and scenario II (in which IMD
average value for 1952-1958 would have been unchanged until 1975) have
been estimated. The next step has been to simulate the impact on absolute
and per capita GDP of these counterfactual values for labour quantity, broad
capital and TFP using the factor shares and the values for land and labour
FIGURE 13
HUMAN CAPITAL, 1939-1975 (LOGS). STRUCTURAL MODEL SIMULATIONS:
BASELINE AND COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIOS
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quantity in the Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009) growth accounting
exercise. The results are presented in Table 6, along with the model simu-
lated (baseline) and actual values.
Our results suggest that, had the macroeconomic distortions of the period
1939-1951 continued throughout the 1950s (scenario I), the growth rate of
per capita income would have shrunk to less than half, and that of TFP to
two-thirds, while the human capital contribution to growth would have
collapsed. The comparison between the outcome of scenarios I and II during
the years 1959-1975 allows us to stress the difference the PSL and the sub-
sequent reforms made for Spain’s economic performance, while simulta-
neously underlining the impact of changes in policies and context operated
throughout the 1950s. Specifically, under scenarios I and II, per capita income
growth would have withered to less than one- and two-thirds, respectively, of
the actual figures.
What would have been, then, Spain’s relative position at the end of
Franco’s dictatorship had pre-1959 macroeconomic distortions remained in
place? Counterfactual levels of real GDP per head suggest that had pre-1951
economic policies remained in place (scenario I), Spain would have fallen
behind Western Europe steadily until 1970, while in the alternative coun-
FIGURE 14
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY, 1939-1975 (LOGS). STRUCTURAL MODEL
SIMULATIONS: BASELINE AND COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIOS
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terfactual hypothesis in which the 1959 PSL would not have been imple-
mented (scenario II), no catching up with Western Europe would have
occurred before 1975. The outcome of these simulations shows a deep
contrast with the actual (and baseline) catching up taking place between
1959 and 1975, as Spain went up from having less than half of Western
European income per head in the 1950s to reaching two-thirds by the time of
Franco’s death (Figure 16). In Table 7, levels of GDP per head in 1975 for
actual and counterfactual Spain are compared with those in OECD, Central
and Eastern Europe and Latin America. In these counterfactual simulations,
Spain would have fallen behind Portugal, Poland and Hungary in the rela-
tively benign scenario II, and below Romania and Colombia in scenario I.
We can conclude, then, that the counterfactual results derived from the VAR
approach accentuate those obtained with the structural model.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has analysed the impact of Franco’s economic reforms on
Spanish economic growth. The important role played by the new economic
FIGURE 15
SPAIN’S RELATIVE REAL PER CAPITA GDP, 1939-1975. ACTUAL AND STRUCTURAL
MODEL SIMULATIONS (WESTERN EUROPE 1251)
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TABLE 4
STRUCTURAL MODEL: GROWTH IN ACTUAL AND SIMULATED ECONOMIC
POLICY SCENARIOS
1939-1951 1952-1958 1959-1975 1939-1958 1939-1975
Per capita GDP growth (%)
Actual 2.1 4.4 5.6 2.9 4.2
Baseline* 1.9 5.5 5.7 3.2 4.4
Scenario I 3.0 3.4 2.9
Scenario II 4.2 3.5
GDP growth (%)
Actual 2.9 5.2 6.7 3.7 5.1
Baseline* 2.7 6.3 6.7 4.0 5.3
Scenario I 3.9 4.4 3.8
Scenario II 5.3 4.5
Investment (% GDP)
Actual 14.3 21.3 24.1 16.7 20.1
Baseline* 15.4 17.7 22.7 16.3 19.4
Scenario I 15.9 18.9 16.7
Scenario II 20.7 18.6
Human capital growth (%)
Actual 20.6 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.6
Baseline* 0.1 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.8
Scenario I 0.9 0.7 0.3
Scenario II 0.8 0.5
TFP growth (%)
Actual 1.2 2.7 4.1 1.7 2.9
Baseline* 0.3 4.0 3.5 1.7 2.5
Scenario I 1.3 2.5 1.8
Scenario II 2.6 2.1
TFP: total factor productivity.
Notes:
Scenario I: assumes 1939-1951 IMD (index of macroeconomic distortions) average value was
maintained over 1952-1975.
Scenario II: assumes 1952-1958 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-1975.
Sources: Computed with parameters from Table 3. See the text and Appendices 1 and 3.
*Model Simulation.
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policy during the 1950s, particularly the 1959 PSL, in promoting sustained
economic growth is confirmed by our results.
A response to an inward-looking growth crisis, the 1959 Stabilisation
Plan, gave way to a new institutional set of policies that favoured the allo-
cation of resources along comparative advantage and allowed sustained
and faster growth, as well as catching up. Without the PSL, per capita GDP
would have been significantly lower at the time of Franco’s death, in 1975.
However, considerable differences in counterfactual outcomes emerge
depending on whether pre-1951 macroeconomic economic distortions had
TABLE 5
SPAIN’S RELATIVE PER CAPITA GDP IN 1975 (1990 GEARY-KHAMIS $): ACTUAL
AND STRUCTURAL MODEL-SIMULATED SCENARIOS
The United States 16,284
Western Europe (12) 12,228
Italy 10,742
Venezuela 10,472
Spain (baseline) 9,164
Spain (actual) 8,357
Argentina 8,122
Greece 7,722
Czechoslovakia 7,399
Ireland 7,316
Spain (scenario II) 6,586
Portugal 6,517
Bulgaria 5,831
Poland 5,808
Hungary 5,805
Uruguay 5,421
Spain (scenario I) 5,205
Mexico 5,158
Yugoslavia 4,836
Note: Western Europe (12) is a population-weighted average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
Sources: Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see text. For other countries, see Maddison (2010).
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remained in place (i.e. with no economic reforms at all), or whether the
1950s restrictions had been maintained until 1975 (namely, without the PSL
being implemented).
TABLE 6
VAR: GROWTH IN ACTUAL AND SIMULATED ECONOMIC POLICY SCENARIOS
1939-
1951
1952-
1958
1959-
1975
1939-
1958
1939-
1975
Per capita GDP Growth (%)
Actual 2.1 4.4 5.6 2.9 4.2
Baseline* 3.2 3.9 4.8 3.5 4.1
Scenario I 1.8 1.7 1.8
Scenario II 3.2 3.0
GDP growth (%)
Actual 2.9 5.2 6.7 3.7 5.1
Baseline* 4.0 4.8 5.8 4.3 5.0
Scenario I 2.7 2.7 2.8
Scenario II 4.3 4.0
Physical capital input growth (%)
Actual 2.3 4.7 7.5 3.2 5.2
Baseline* 2.1 4.2 6.6 2.9 4.7
Scenario I 2.3 2.9 2.6
Scenario II 5.1 4.0
Human capital growth (%)
Actual 20.6 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.6
Baseline* 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.6
Scenario I 20.1 0.0 20.2
Scenario II 0.4 0.3
TFP growth (%)
Actual 1.2 2.7 4.1 1.7 2.9
Baseline* 1.9 2.8 3.6 2.2 2.9
Scenario I 1.7 1.9 1.6
Scenario II 2.7 2.2
VAR: vector autoregression.
Notes:
Scenario I: assumes 1939-1951 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-1975.
Scenario II: assumes 1952-1958 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-1975.
*Model simulation.
Sources: Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009), Appendix 4 and also see the text.
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Thus, our quantitative results qualify a popular view that depicts the first
two decades of Franco’s dictatorship as a homogeneous autarchic era and
portrays the 1959 PSL as a major discontinuity between two opposite worlds.
Without the policy reforms and economic growth of the 1950s, it seems
unlikely the PSL would have succeeded29.
Several suggestions for further research can be extracted from our his-
torical investigation. The advantage of case studies is the first one. Then, in
order to analyse historical episodes of major policy reforms, an IMD could be
a useful tool. Our investigation also indicates that a detailed analysis of the
various channels through which the dictatorship could impact on economic
growth seems necessary. Lastly, the experience of Franco’s Spain confirms
that successful stabilisation programmes can take place under authoritarian
political regimes.
FIGURE 16
SPAIN’S RELATIVE PER CAPITA GDP: ACTUAL AND VAR SIMULATIONS, 1939-1975
(WESTERN EUROPE 125 1)
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29 In this regard, it is worth pointing out interesting similarities between the 1959 Stabilisation
Plan and the Marshall Plan. In both cases, success depended on the fact that the countries involved
were growing already and their governments had opened up their economies, reassuring economic
agents about their commitment to free markets and international integration (De Long and
Eichengreen 1991).
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APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES
«Black market» premium: computed from Martı´nez Ruiz (2003), Serrano
Sanz and Asensio Castillo (1997), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and Martı´n
Acen˜a and Pons (2005), (Table 9.19).
Budget Balance (% GDP): budget balance, Comı´n and Dı´az Fuentes (2005),
(Table 12.24); GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003)(Table A13.1).
CIM (contract-intensive money): Prados de la Escosura (unpublished
estimates).
Financial Depth (M2/GDP): M2, Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005),
Table 9.16; GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A13.1.
GINI: Prados de la Escosura (2008).
Government Consumption (% total Consumption) (G/G1C) and (% GDP)
(G/GDP): Prados de la Escosura (2003). Table A.13.3.
HK (labour quality): Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009).
IMD: See the text.
Inflation rate (derived from GDP implicit deflator): Prados de la Escosura
(2003), Table A.11.9.
Interest (interest rate): Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005), Table 9.17.
Investment rate: Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A.13.3.
K Input (physical capital input): Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2010a).
LAB (labour quantity): Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009).
OPEN (openness), (exports1 imports)/GDP: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
table A.13.3.
RUCK (relative user’s cost of capital): user’s cost of capital, Prados de la Escosura
and Rose´s (2009); GDP deflator, Prados de la Escosura (2003), A11.9.
TFP (total factor productivity): Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009).
APPENDIX 2: THE CONSTRUCTION OF IMD
In this appendix, we will discuss several alternative compositions for our
IMD. In order to include variables into the index, we employ Principal
Component Analysis. The results are presented in Tables A2.1 to A2.9.
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The variables considered are: inflation, black market premium, Government
consumption (excluding health and education) over total consumption or
GDP, budget balance over GDP, M2/GDP, rate of openness and the degree
of financial depth (M2/GDP). Although the rationale for including a new
TABLE A2.1
IMD 1
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.708 20.530 Factor 1 50.129 50.129
Black market 0.777 20.117 Factor 2 27.979 78.129
G/G1C 0.632 0.738
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
TABLE A2.2
IMD 2
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.788 20.398 Factor 1 47.454 47.454
Black Market 0.671 0.068 Factor 2 25.141 72.594
M2/GDP 0.851 20.033
G/GDP 0.323 0.917
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
TABLE A2.3
IMD 3
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.803 0.235 Factor 1 48.891 48.891
Black market 0.650 0.136 Factor 2 22.347 71.238
M2/GDP 0.830 0.147
Budget Bal/
GDP
20.447 0.894
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
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variable in the index is that it increases the percentage of the variance
explained, we decided to include the variables «black market», inflation and
the share of government consumption in total consumption, and not just the
TABLE A2.4
IMD 4
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.828 0.167 Factor 1 46.192 46.192
Black market 0.679 20.569 Factor 2 33.216 79.409
M2/GDP 0.836 0.337
Openness 20.037 0.929
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
TABLE A2.5
IMD 5
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.757 20.257 Factor 1 38.359 38.359
Black market 0.561 20.574 Factor 2 31.720 70.079
M2/GDP 0.869 20.007
Budget bal/
GDP
0.451 0.624
Openness 0.269 0.895
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
TABLE A2.6
IMD 6
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.777 0.334 Factor 1 38.880 38.880
Black market 0.745 20.355 Factor 2 28.960 67.840
M2/GDP 0.738 0.519
Openness 20.201 0.855
G/G1C 0.448 20.459
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions
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first two, because the last one is relevant for the whole considered period,
1850-1975.
APPENDIX 3: ECONOMETRICS OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL
We develop a set of econometric tests over our data before to proceed
with estimation of equations [1]-[5] (model of Table 3). Our initial empirical
TABLE A2.7
IMD 7
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.804 0.104 Factor 1 39.114 39.114
Black market 0.647 20.605 Factor 2 26.750 65.864
Budget Bal/
GDP
20.447 20.147
M2/GDP 0.831 0.279
Openness 0.01 0.928
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
TABLE A2.8
IMD 8
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.831 20.329 Factor 1 61.573 61.573
Black market 0.667 0.745 Factor 2 24.425 85.999
M2/GDP 0.844 20.264
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
TABLE A2.9
IMD 9
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Percentage
of variance
Accumulated
percentage of variance
Inflation 0.813 20.582 Factor 1 66.164 66.164
Black market 0.813 0.582 Factor 2 33.836 100.000
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions.
Sources: Appendix 1.
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TABLE A3.1
VARIABLES IN THE STRUCTURAL MODEL: ORDER OF INTEGRATION
Variables (logs) ADF test levels ADF test first differences Order of integration
GDP 1.299 29.333 I(1)
INVT 22.292 28.881 I(1)
TFP 20.477 23.233 I(1)
LAB 22.215 29.792 I(1)
IMD 22.047 214.520 I(1)
OPEN 21.815 210.555 I(1)
RUCK 21.845 212.014 I(1)
HK 0.144 217.387 I(1)
GINI 22.463 213.353 I(1)
DEPTH 22.452 213.353 I(1)
ADF: augmented Dickey–Fuller test; INVT: investment rate; TFP: total factor productivity; LAB: labour
quantity; RUCK: relative user’s cost of capital; IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions; OPEN: openness
measured as % (exports1 imports)/GDP; HK: labour quality; INTEREST: nominal interest rate; CIM:
contract-intensive money.
Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD. The ADF test levels have been
considered with constant and trend in all cases except for RUCK and IMD that have been considered with
only constant and without constant and trend, respectively. The level of significance is in all cases at 1%,
except for TFP, which is at 10%.
Sources: See the text.
TABLE A3.2
LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLE PAIRS
Pairs of Variables ADF test over the residuals of the long-run relationship
IMD and RUCK 24.22**
IMD and TFP 22.48**
RUCK and INVT 23.420***
ADF: augmented Dickey–Fuller test; IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions; RUCK: relative user’s
cost of capital; TFP: total factor productivity; INVT: investment rate.
Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD.
The ADF test levels have been considered with constant and trend in all cases except for the
relationship between IMD and TFP that have been considered without constant and without trend. The
level of significance is at 5% (**) and at 10% (***).
Sources: See the text.
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goal is to find a stable long-run relationship between each pair of relevant
variables, which will permit us to test for causality. First, we investigate the
order of integration of different variables (see Table A3.1).
Owing to the fact that all these variables are integrated of order one, we
test the null hypothesis that there is a co-integration relation between IMD
and RUCK, RUCK and INVT, IMD and TFP. The results obtained are pre-
sented in Table A3.2.
A co-integration relationship has been found between these four pairs of
variables, each of these have a common trend, and hence a stable short-run
relationship. IMD is affecting positively RUCK, which in turn affects nega-
tively INVT, and negatively to TFP and GDP (as we have predicted earlier).
These results lead us to develop a Granger causality test between each
variable pair using the residuals from the estimation of the long-run equili-
brium relationship.
Granger causality tests of Table A3.3 suggest causality from IMD to
RUCK rather than the other way round. Applying a similar approach, we also
find that IMD Granger-causes TFP. Therefore, after conducting these
co-integration and Granger tests, we are able to confirm that the IMD is
behind RUCK and TFP.
TABLE A3.3
GRANGER CAUSALITY BETWEEN IMD, RUCK AND TFP
Pairwise Granger causality test
Null hypothesis F-statistic x2
Row 1
IMD does not Granger cause RUCK 6.39 12.79
RUCK does not Granger cause IMD 2.91 5.81
Row 2
RUCK does not Granger cause INVT 5.89 17.67
INVT does not Granger cause RUCK 3.09 9.28
Row 3
IMD does not Granger cause TFP 6.09 18.27
TFP does not Granger cause IMD 0.79 2.37
IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions; RUCK: relative user’s cost of capital; TFP: total factor
productivity; INVT: investment rate.
Note: The critical values are 2.29 for F-statistic and 11.07 for the x2 test.
Sources: See the text.
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APPENDIX 4: VECTOR AUTO REGRESSION ESTIMATES
TABLE A4.1
VAR ESTIMATES BETWEEN PHYSICAL CAPITAL GROWTH AND IMD
Log capital input IMD
Log capital input (21) 0.777144 24.544382
(0.05332) (2.33417)
[14.5751] [21.94690]
IMD (21) 20.003633 0.758758
(0.00144) (0.06294)
[22.52669] [12.0558]
C 0.004350 0.052301
(0.00192) (0.08400)
[2.26691] [0.62260]
Dummy 1940 0.011921 0.342067
(0.00348) (0.15231)
[3.42639] [2.24590]
R2 0.760904 0.761801
Adjusted R2 0.754927 0.755846
Sum sq. resids 0.018175 34.82962
SE equation 0.012307 0.538746
F-statistic 127.2970 127.9271
Log likelihood 371.3881 297.21994
AIC 25.925615 1.632580
SC 25.834638 1.723556
Mean dependent 0.034282 20.031924
s.d. dependent 0.024860 1.090316
Determinant residual covariance 4.37E-05
Log likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 270.5266
AIC 24.234300
SC 24.052346
VAR: vector autoregression; IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions; Sum sq. resids: sum of square
residuals; AIC: Akaike information criteria; SC: Schwarz criteria.
Notes: Data are presented as SE (in parenthesis) and t-statistics [in brackets].
Variables are expressed in differences.
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value 0 before 1940 and value 1 after 1940.
Sources: See the text.
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TABLE A4.2
VAR ESTIMATES BETWEEN HUMAN CAPITAL GROWTH AND IMD
Log labour quality IMD
Log labour quality (21) 20.439345 0.386691
(0.08058) (2.77287)
[25.45211] [0.13946]
IMD (21) 20.005519 0.818352
(0.00165) (0.05665)
[23.35228] [14.4463]
C 0.000769 20.057176
(0.00185) (0.06365)
[0.41588] [20.89825]
Dummy 1940 0.012991 0.192640
(0.00394) (0.13566)
[3.29524] [1.42003]
R2 0.242014 0.754317
Adjusted R2 0.223064 0.748175
Sum sq. resids 0.030339 35.92395
SE equation 0.015901 0.547144
F-statistic 12.77140 122.8116
Log likelihood 339.6182 299.13798
AIC 25.413197 1.663516
SC 25.322220 1.754493
Mean dependent 0.003373 20.031924
s.d. dependent 0.018039 1.090316
Determinant residual covariance 7.55E-05
Log likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 236.5887
AIC 23.686914
SC 23.504960
VAR: vector autoregression; IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions; Sum sq. resides: sum of square
residuals; AIC: Akaike information criteria; SC: Schwarz criteria.
Notes: Data are presented as SE (in parenthesis) and t-statistics [in brackets].
Variables are expressed in differences.
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value 0 before 1940 and value on1 after 1940.
Sources: See the text.
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TABLE A4.3
VAR ESTIMATES BETWEEN TFP GROWTH AND IMD
Log TFP IMD
Log TFP (21) 0.135529 23.671434
(0.09509) (2.80841)
[1.42527] [21.30730]
IMD (21) 20.004878 0.783041
(0.00209) (0.06161)
[22.33840] [12.7093]
C 20.000482 20.064355
(0.00215) (0.06340)
[20.22433] [21.01500]
Dummy 1940 0.030082 0.337519
(0.00583) (0.17221)
[5.15924] [1.95995]
R2 0.355266 0.757728
Adjusted R2 0.339147 0.751671
Sum sq. resids 0.040613 35.42525
SE equation 0.018397 0.543333
F-statistic 22.04107 125.1036
Log likelihood 321.5369 298.27125
AIC 25.121564 1.649536
SC 25.030587 1.740513
Mean dependent 0.009736 20.031924
s.d. dependent 0.022630 1.090316
Determinant residual covariance 9.00E-05
Log likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 225.6467
AIC 23.510431
SC 23.328477
VAR: vector autoregression; TFP: total factor productivity; IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions;
Sum sq. resids: sum of square residuals; AIC: Akaike information criteria; SC: Schwarz criteria.
Notes: Data are presented as SE (in parenthesis) and t-statistics [in brackets].
Variables are expressed in differences.
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value 0 before 1940 and value 1 after 1940.
Sources: See the text.
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TABLE A4.4
VAR ESTIMATES BETWEEN LABOUR QUANTITY GROWTH AND IMD
D log labour quantity IMD
D-log labour quantity (21) 0.174008 0.987282
(0.09367) (1.24007)
[1.85764] [0.79615]
IMD (21) 0.000649 0.828784
(0.00437) (0.05783)
[0.14846] [14.3308]
C 0.005772 20.056854
(0.00479) (0.06342)
[1.20489] [20.89651]
Dummy 1940 0.006202 0.165360
(0.01051) (0.13919)
[0.58987] [1.18800]
R2 0.039370 0.755569
Adjusted R2 0.015354 0.749458
Sum sq. resids 0.203936 35.74098
SE equation 0.041225 0.545749
F-statistic 1.639319 123.6451
Log likelihood 221.4860 298.82139
AIC 23.507839 1.658410
SC 23.416862 1.749386
Mean dependent 0.009173 20.031924
s.d. dependent 0.041545 1.090316
Determinant residual covariance 0.000452
Log likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 125.5502
AIC 21.895971
SC 21.714018
VAR: vector autoregression; IMD: index of macroeconomic distortions; Sum sq. resids: sum of square
residuals; AIC: Akaike information criteria; SC: Schwarz criteria.
Notes: Data are presented as SE (in parenthesis) and t-statistics [in brackets].
Variables are expressed in differences.
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value 0 before 1940 and value 1 after 1940.
Sources: See the text.
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